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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the price effects of environmental certification on commercial real 
estate assets.  It is argued that there are likely to be three main drivers of price differences 
between certified and non-certified buildings.  These are additional occupier benefits, lower 
holding costs for investors and a lower risk premium.  Drawing upon the CoStar database of 
US commercial real estate assets, hedonic regression analysis is used to measure the effect of 
certification on both rent and price.  The results suggest that, compared to buildings in the 
same submarkets, eco-certified buildings have both a rental and sale price premium.   
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Introduction 
 
Given that buildings are estimated to be responsible for 20% of greenhouse gas emissions, 
there is growing awareness within the real estate sector of global warming and the role of the 
real estate in reducing the environmental effects of business (Stern Review, 2007).  Whether a 
purely market-driven approach or mandatory environmental regulations imposed by 
governments and supranational organizations can be expected to be more effective in 
reducing carbon emissions from the building stock is a highly contested issue.  In the real 
estate sector, a blend of mandatory government regulation and voluntary industry standards 
has emerged in response to pressure to reduce the environmental impact of the building stock.  
As a result, required building standards have tended to become more stringent.  Mandatory 
certification has been introduced.  A good example is the introduction of a requirement for 
buildings to publicly display Energy Performance Certificates following the EU Directive on 
the Energy Performance of Buildings in 2003.  However, additionally, the growth of 
environmentalism has lead to the emergence of market-based approaches in the form of a 
range of voluntary, environmental certification systems for buildings such as Green Star 
(Australia), LEED (USA), Energy Star (USA), Green Globes (USA), and BREEAM (UK).   
 
Price signals are central to the operation of markets providing the information basis for the 
allocation of resources.  For market-based solutions to be successful, prices need to reflect 
environmental costs and benefits. In a real estate context, higher risk-adjusted returns of 
certified assets potentially provide a signal that is transmitted from the investment market to 
the space market subsequently causing an increase in the supply of green buildings.  Although 
‘green markets’ have expanded dramatically in some sectors of the economy in response to 
pricing signals, there is little empirical evidence that commercial real estate prices are 
influenced by their sustainability characteristics despite widely propagated financial and 
environmental benefits.  
 
This paper investigates the price differentials between LEED/Energy Star certified buildings 
and non-certified commercial buildings in the US.  The contributions are twofold.  Firstly, it 
seeks to provide a theoretical grounding for the expected price differential between certified 
and non-certified buildings.  Given that the literature suggests that certified buildings may 
offer a bundle of benefits linked to lower operating costs, improved employee productivity, 
tax credits and image benefits relative to non-certified buildings, we use a static partial 
equilibrium framework to demonstrate short-run price effects of certification.  Assuming that 
the benefits of certification outweigh the costs, the theoretical analysis suggests short-run 
rental price premium for green buildings due to inward shifts in the demand curve for non-
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certified buildings.  However, in the long-run the persistence of rental price premia is 
contingent upon the level of market penetration and changes in regulation and technology.  It 
is argued that asset price premia are a reflection of higher rental incomes, lower holding costs 
and/or reduced risk premia.   
 
The second contribution of the paper is empirical.  We measure both the effect of voluntary 
certification on occupational prices (rents) and on asset prices (sales).  In the empirical 
analysis, certified buildings are compared to a sample of non-certified buildings which were 
selected to include properties in the same submarket areas as the certified sample.  For the 
whole sample, rents and prices are related to a set of hedonic characteristics of the buildings 
such as age, location, number of stories inter alia.  Essentially, our hedonic model is 
measuring price differences between certified buildings and randomly selected non-certified 
buildings in the same submarkets controlling for differences in age, height, quality, sub-
market etc.  We first estimate the rental regression for a sample of 197 LEED and 834 Energy 
Star as well as over 15,000 benchmark buildings.  The results suggest that certified buildings 
have an average rental premium of 4-5%.  Furthermore, based on a sample of sale prices for 
559 Energy Star and 127 LEED-certified buildings, we find price premia of 26% and 25% 
respectively with higher levels of certification achieving higher premia.     
 
This paper is organized as follows.  The first section provides background discussion to the 
topic focusing on the growth in environmental certification, the nature of environmentally 
responsible buildings and previous research on their costs and benefits.  This is followed by a 
theoretical analysis of the anticipated price effects of environmental certification for 
commercial real estate assets in both occupier and investment markets.  Thirdly, the main 
empirical section outlines the data and methods used in the study followed by a discussion of 
the results. Finally conclusions are drawn.  
 
Background 
 
The market for eco-friendly products has been expanding for a range of consumer products in 
response to a willingness-to-pay (WTP) premium for goods and services which are considered 
to have reduced environmental costs.  This global growth in the market for products with 
lower environmental costs has stimulated an array of voluntary certification and labeling 
codes in a number of industries.   Reinforcing this shift is the fact that many certification and 
labeling codes are viewed as contributing to a price-based solution to promote, what is 
essentially, private provision of environmental public goods (Kotchen, 2006).  The LEED 
 5 
Green Building Rating System and the Environmental Protection Agency’s Energy Star are 
two schemes that have been developed for the commercial real estate sector in the US.   
 
The LEED Green Building Rating System, developed by the U.S. Green Building Council, 
consists of set of standards for the assessment of environmentally sustainable construction.  
The rates of growth in numbers of 'green' buildings have been rapid with numbers doubling 
nearly every two years. As of May 1, 2009, there are 657 LEED-certified office buildings and 
2,393 Energy Star rated commercial buildings in the CoStar database.  In common with the 
major regional certification such as Green Star and BREEAM, the rating system focuses on 
six broad categories related to sustainability of location, water efficiency, energy and 
atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmental quality and innovation and design 
process.   
 
There are different levels of LEED accreditation based upon a scoring founded upon the six 
major categories listed above.  The thresholds are mainly absolute in the sense that all 
buildings put forward that meet the required standards are certified.  In LEED for new 
construction and major renovations for commercial premises, buildings may qualify for four 
levels of certification: Certified, Silver, Gold and Platinum.  In contrast to the rather 
comprehensive assessment of buildings under the LEED scheme, Energy Star certification 
considers solely the energy performance of a property.  Buildings are awarded a score out of 
100.  Another difference to LEED is that Energy Star is a measure of relative energy 
efficiency and environmental performance.  Only buildings that are in the top quartile of 
buildings put forward are eligible for Energy Star accreditation.   
 
It is notable that there have been reports of some real estate developers making fraudulent 
claims about having obtained LEED certification in the early stages of construction (see Burr, 
2009). This underlines the perceived attractiveness of the LEED certification scheme. 
Furthermore, LEED certification is more costly to obtain in terms of fees, encompasses a 
broader range of sustainable attributes and is comparable to other real estate eco-certification 
schemes in the UK, Germany and Australia.  There is an expectation that premia should vary 
between Energy Star and LEED certified buildings and also within the different levels of 
LEED buildings.   
 
There is a large body of work on the attractions of and case for green buildings.   Depending 
on the linkage between price and production cost, the existence and size of a cost premium to 
construct certified buildings may be relevant to price premia.  There are two main types of 
additional costs associated with obtaining eco-certification for commercial buildings.  The 
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first are the payments to the certifying body for rating the building.  The second are the 
additional production costs associated with meeting the certification standards.  In terms of 
the latter, there have been a number of studies of the construction cost premium associated 
with achieving certification (see, for example, Kats, 2003; Berry, 2007; Morrison Hershfield, 
2005).  These studies suggest small construction cost premia of around 2% on average.    The 
most recent and authoritative studies have come from Davis Langdon (a global construction 
consultancy).  Their most recent study compared 83 building projects with a primary goal of 
LEED certification with 138 similar building projects without the goal of sustainable design 
(Davis Langdon, 2006).  Confirming the findings of earlier studies, they found no significant 
difference in average costs for building projects with a primary goal of LEED certification as 
compared to non-certified buildings.   
 
In return, a range of benefits are attributed to green buildings or associated with features 
common in green buildings.  Owners, developers and occupiers may obtain benefit from the 
diverse range of subsidies and tax benefits1 that have appeared for LEED-certified buildings.   
For tenants these are related to reduced operating costs of the building) (mainly associated 
with energy and other utility savings), improved productivity of the occupying business 
(associated with reduced staff turnover, absenteeism inter alia), possible tax and other 
incentives and other competitive advantages linked to marketing and image benefits. It is 
expected that these benefits will produce increased rental bids from potential tenants.  It 
should be noted that the nature of the lease contract will determine whether tenants benefit 
directly from reduced energy and other utilities.  Tenants with net rental contracts pay these 
costs directly and therefore should be attracted premises with lower operating costs, whilst 
tenants on gross rental contracts will not benefit directly from such savings.  
 
In addition to the possible rental premiums, owners may also benefit from reduced holding 
costs (due to lower vacancy rates and higher tenant retention), reduced operational costs (due 
to energy and other utility savings), reduced depreciation (linked to the use of latest 
technologies) and reduced regulatory risks.  Ex ante, micro-level studies have found that the 
present value of the reduced operating costs alone is sufficient to cover the construction cost 
premium (see Kats, 2003, ECOFYS, 2003).  The crucial question is then if and to what extent 
occupiers of certified of space exhibit a willingness  to pay for the cost savings and other 
benefits associated with eco-certified space.  In this sense, WTP reflects the amount of money 
a consumer is willing to contribute to equalize a utility change (Mäler, 1974; Field and Field 
2009).  Besides observing revealed preferences WTP is primarily measured through 
                                               
1
 A number of states have introduced various incentives to encourage greater supply of certified 
buildings. 
 7 
contingent valuation surveys (Becker et al, 1964).  In a real estate context, contingent 
valuation surveys have revealed that occupiers are prepared to compensate owners for the 
additional costs of green buildings through higher rents (see GVA Grimley, 2007 and 
McGraw Hill Construction, 2006 for examples).  However, the value of such stated 
preference studies is limited by the ‘cheap talk’ problem.  It is important to distinguish 
between what occupiers and investors state that they are ready to pay from what they really 
pay.  
 
Notwithstanding the high growth rates of eco-certified buildings in recent years -albeit from a 
low base, their relatively low proportion of the overall market may appear puzzling given the 
apparent benefits of certified relative to non-certified buildings.  This may be attributed to 
market failure - when allocations resulting from rational agents operating in decentralized 
markets are sub-optimal.  This is widely implied in the literature and research to date (for 
examples, see RICS, 2005; Guy, 1998; UNEP, 2007 and Upstream, 2004).  The lack of 
adoption of sustainable features is linked with the lack of an appropriate investment return 
through the pricing process.  This has been explained by imperfect information, split 
incentives, risk aversion, high discount rates and skills shortages inter alia. In addition, there 
may be other reasons that, despite its importance, sustainability may not be reflected in the 
prices of buildings.  The pricing process may be dominated by the weight placed by market 
participants on a number of overriding attributes e.g. location, appearance.  Further, the 
heterogeneity of real estate may also be hindering the measurement of price impacts.    
 
An alternative perspective that must be considered is that there is no market failure and that 
firms are not systematically making non-trivial mistakes in their evaluation of investments in 
environmental beneficial investments.  It has been found that the high discount rates applied 
by businesses to investments in energy saving technologies and investment opportunities are 
not unique to energy (Anderson and Newell, 2004).  In a similar vein, Sanstad, Hanemann 
and Auffhammer (2006) point out that many of the barriers identified above are normal 
features of markets.  They examine the suggestion that what seems to be evidence of irrational 
underinvestment may therefore reflect measurement error, the omission of relevant costs and 
other analytical failures.   
 
Much of the research of the pricing effect of sustainable features in commercial property 
assets has been normative i.e. analyzing what the price effect should be; rather than positive 
i.e. what the price effect actually has been.  Studies have focused on quantifying expected 
price effects of sustainable features in commercial real assets rather than measuring observed 
effects (see Ellison et al, 2007).  In many cases, it is clear that the researchers are frustrated 
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and disappointed at the absence of empirical evidence to validate their deductive reasoning on 
price effects (see RICS, 2005).   
 
Additionally, whilst it is indisputable that some attributes of buildings have clear effects on 
their market price, it is not always clear that increased cost due to higher specification leads to 
increased value.  In order to ‘compensate’ for the additional costs of construction of certified 
buildings, rational investors will require a combination of higher income and/or reduced risk.  
In research on the pricing of variations in lease terms, the standard assumption of lease 
pricing models is that real estate investors will extract the same value from the property 
regardless of leases structure (see Grenadier, 1995, Booth and Walsh, 2001, Ambrose, 
Hendershott and Klosek, 2002).  In short, investors are assumed to be fully compensated for 
the costs of providing attributes that occupiers demand.  However, in practice, institutional 
features of the rent determination process may prevent the transmission of expected price 
effects to actual prices.  For instance, researchers have been unable to identify empirically an 
expected term structure of rents (see Bond, Loizou and McAllister, 2008, Englund, Gunnelin, 
Hoesli and Söderberg, 2003).   
 
It is clear from the discussion above that real estate investors may be rewarded for the 
additional costs of providing certified buildings in three main ways: higher rents, lower 
holding costs and/or lower risk.  Effects may be identified in either the occupier and/or the 
investment market.  Failure to observe price premia in certified buildings would provide an 
economic disincentive to real estate investors to supply certified buildings given the 
additional costs of certification.   
 
Anticipated Price Effects – Theoretical Considerations 
 
Before proceeding to our empirical analysis, we analyze the anticipated price effects.  The 
first part of this analysis is based on Rosen’s assumption that any good or service consists of a 
variety of utility-bearing characteristics (z1, z2,…zn) that make up the hedonic price function 
Rosen  (1974).  In the context of office rent determination, these are comprised of various 
structural, locational and lease characteristics that enter into the empirical model as 
independent variables.  The empirically determined hedonic prices are indicative of an 
implicit market so that demand and supply functions can be derived for both short-run and 
long-run competitive equilibria.  Although certified and non-certified properties may not be 
close substitutes in the marketplace - particularly for the group of eco-consumers - we assume 
in the first step that they are variations of an ingredient i (in our case eco-certification) of a 
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product.  In a vector z of bundles of relevant characteristics, zi represents the presence and 
level of eco-certification of a given building.  The resulting bid or value function of a 
consumer is determined by the concave utility values of uzi   (the utility of certification in the 
presence of all other relevant attributes), ux  (the utility of all other products consumed) and y 
(the budget constraint). The bid function θzi  is thus described as:  
1,01,0 =<−=>= y
x
u
x
z
z andUU
U
i
i
θθθ      (1) 
At a given utility and budget, this function reveals a consumer’s implicit willingness to pay  
for a given vector of building attributes z.  Within the space of possible indifference surfaces 
arising from this, utility is maximized where the consumer’s bid function equals the market 
price as θzi (z*,u*,y*) = pi(z*) where * denotes optimum quantities.   
 
Turning to producers, the offer function φ is determined by the vector of characteristics 
containing among others eco-certification (or lack thereof) zi, a profit maximizing condition 
pi,and a shift parameter β reflecting the cost minimization of factor prices and production 
function parameters.  Taking into account the optimal number of units produced with 
specification zi, the producer’s equilibrium function is determined at the intersection or 
tangency between the profit-attributes-costs indifference curve and the market characteristics 
–implicit price surface in the form φ
 
(zi*, pi *, β *) = pi(z*).  Figure 1 shows implicit 
equilibrium prices for the characteristic zi representing eco-certification   The marginal price 
of eco-certification is shown by pi (z) where the optimal level of z is defined as the 
intersection of the marginal value to the consumer and the marginal cost to the producer.   
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Figure 1:  Marginal hedonic prices of eco-certification resulting from equilibrium reservation 
prices  
NOTE: This figure shows derivatives of a consumer’s bid function θzi  representing demand-reservation prices for 
buildings with various levels of eco-certification and the producer’s function φzi representing reservation supply 
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prices of an increment in the level of eco-certification zi. The resulting dashed line pi (z) is then the marginal price 
of incremental levels of eco-certification zi where reservation demand prices and reservation supply prices 
intersect. 
 
To demonstrate the effect of a set of implicit marginal prices for various levels of eco-
certification on aggregate supply, we use a static partial equilibrium framework (see Sedjo 
and Swallow, 2002).  In line with our basic assumption in the first part of this analysis, we 
hypothesize that both types of products are not perfect substitutes but operate in a closely 
interrelated market so that an increase in demand for certified buildings will be reflected in a 
fall in demand for non-certified buildings.  As demand for certified buildings increases, it will 
lead to an increase in their rents/prices and, given short-run inelasticity of supply, a premium 
will be observed.  The key issue is the extent to which (or indeed whether) eco-certification 
changes the demand and supply functions for certified and non-certified buildings.  Key 
factors are the additional costs associated with certification and the willingness of occupiers 
to pay an additional sum for certified buildings.  The additional costs and willingness to pay 
are also expected to increase as the level of certification increases producing different 
equilibrium prices and quantities for different levels of certification.    
 
In Figure 2, the rental supply and demand curves for space are plotted for certified and non-
certified buildings.  The central assumption is that the supply and demand curves are different 
for certified and non-certified buildings and among the different levels of certification e.g. 
LEED Silver relative to LEED Platinum.  Assuming increased costs associated with 
certification, supply is more inelastic as developers require increased prices to offset these 
costs (Sncb → Scb1).2  In addition, the demand curve for certified buildings shifts outwards as 
occupiers are assumed to be prepared to pay more for certified products (Dncb → Dcb1).  The 
resulting equilibrium prices and quantities Pncb, Pcb1 and Qcb1, Qcb1 indicate higher prices and 
lower quantities for certified buildings.  However, the demand curves converge since it is 
assumed that the marginal willingness to pay a premium by eco-consumers diminishes as the 
quantity supplied increases3.  This means that, when large quantities are consumed at a low 
price, the premium disappears.  In extremis, when the price is effectively zero, the quantities 
demanded are equal for certified and non-certified space.    
 
                                               
2
 There is also a possibility, however, that the ratio of differential value of certified space to total 
marginal value depends on the level of price. This would produce a different set of demand curves and 
ultimately different equilibrium prices.  
3
 An alternative demand curve rotation could be hypothesized.  For instance, it could be argued that, if 
occupiers gain less utility from consumption of the first unit of a certified product relative to 
subsequent units, the premium that occupiers are willing to pay increases as their total consumption of 
the certified product increases.  Following this assumption, the demand curves pivot around the 
intercept on the vertical axis.  
However, the market for certified buildings is not homogeneous. The additional costs and 
WTP are assumed to increase as the level of certification increases producing different 
equilibrium prices and quantities for different levels of certification.   A
simplified two-tier certification system, prices increase from 
level of certification than cb1. 
 
 
Figure 2: Short-run effect of introducing certification into the market
NOTE: This figure shows the various aggregate demand and supply curves for non
buildings with different qualities of eco
there is an upward shift in the supply curve.  It is assumed that higher levels of certification have higher costs and 
that the supply curve shifts further upwar
manner the demand curve for certified buildings shift
certified products (Dncb → Dcb1 → Dcb2
 
Whilst the discussion above essentially analyzes possible market outcomes in a static partial 
equilibrium framework, the dynamic aspects of market entry and diffusion pertaining
effects need to be explored.  In the long
certified and non-certified space is more intricate depending on, among other factors, the 
market share of certified space.  As market penetration of t
supply curves of certified space shift downwards which increases aggregate quantities and 
reduces prices.   
 
gain, a
Pcb1 to Pcb2 where cb2 
 
-certified buildings and for 
-certification.  Certification is assumed to increase production costs so that 
ds and the becomes more inelastic (Sncb → Scb1 → Scb2).  
s outwards to reflect an assumed increase in WTP for 
).  Thus, different partial equilibrium quantities and prices are established. 
-run, the dynamic interaction between the markets for 
he new product progresses, the 
ssuming a 
is a higher 
 
In the same 
 
 to price 
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When measuring the change in demand arising from the introduction of a new product, two 
separate effects have to be disentangled: a variety effect resulting from increased product 
differentiation in a particular market and a pure price effect resulting from changes of prices 
of existing products following the introduction of the new product (see Hausman and 
Leonard, 2001 and Brynjolfsson et al., 2003).  Leaving aside the variety effect on both 
certified and non-certified space, we hypothesize that economies of scale in eco-building 
production and services will tend in the longer term to reduce the marginal and average costs 
of certification.  The comparatively more advanced production technology involved in 
producing eco-certified buildings is expected to command a price premium that is relatively 
large at the time of initial market entry but declines with increasing standardization and 
market share of the certified product.  Thus, the price premium is simultaneously eroded by 
both supply-side factors, i.e. lower cost of producing a unit of certified space and demand-
side factors, i.e. diminishing image benefits to consumers as certified space becomes the 
norm.  In this setting, premiums are expected to decline to a level that purely reflects the cost 
savings.   
 
However, long run price differentials are likely to be driven by technological progress, market 
penetration rates and regulation, all of which are very difficult to foresee at this point.  If 
regulatory standards were both static and absolute and market penetration increased, utility 
from eco-certification would be expected to decrease as an increasing proportion of the 
building stock reached the level of environmental performance required for certification.  
Where environmental performance standards are relative (e.g. certification granted based on 
evidence of environmental performance in the top quartile of all buildings), there will by 
definition be a group of buildings that are considered a separate market segment irrespective 
of general standards.  Premia for this group of buildings are likely to persist.  However, where 
there are absolute certification standards, required environmental performance thresholds are 
unlikely to remain fixed at current levels and definitions.  When environmental standards 
become more stringent in absolute terms, buildings certified under a previous regime will be 
affected by regulatory obsolescence and may become regarded as an inferior market segment.  
As a result, in the long run, rental price effects are contingent upon changes in the regulatory 
regime and upon the blend of relative and absolute thresholds that are introduced.  These 
changes will also influence capital values.   
 
In addition to rental premia, as discussed above there are additional ways in which asset 
pricing of marginal investors may be affected by certification.  The Net Operating Incomes of 
certified buildings may be higher than those of non-certified buildings due to rental premia, 
higher occupancy rates, incomes from incentives and subsidies and reduced outgoings due to 
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lower operating costs.  Expected income growth may also be higher than non-certified 
buildings due to reduced depreciation and obsolescence.  In terms of the denominator of the 
standard valuation equation, it could be argued that the reductions in regulatory risk 
(sometimes referred to as future-proofing) associated with certified buildings and the relative 
reductions in uncertainty of income may mean that investors apply a lower risk premium.  
Whilst many of these anticipated effects on costs and incomes are, at present, largely 
conjectures, below we investigate whether expected effects on prices can be observed 
empirically. 
 
Actual Price Effects – Empirical Research 
 
There have been few studies have attempted to measure the price effects of green building 
certification.  Studies that have identified higher rents and improved returns based on the 
views and experiences of expert professions still require empirical verification.  Recent 
reviews of the extant literature agree on the centrality of pricing to adoption but have found 
little convincing evidence of a certification premium (see Berry, 2007).  In a further study, 
Nelson (2007) examines the performance differences between certified and non-certified 
buildings using a number of criteria.  Drawing upon the CoStar database, the author compares 
LEED rated buildings and Energy Star buildings with a vastly larger sample of non-certified 
buildings in the CoStar database.  He acknowledges the significant differences between the 
sample and the wider population and finds that certified buildings tend to be newer, owner-
occupied or single tenanted, concentrated geographically and sectorally (in the office sector).  
Recognizing that it did not control for these differences, the study identifies lower vacancy 
rates and higher rents in LEED-rated buildings.   
 
There have been a group of studies that draw upon the CoStar database of US properties to 
identify the effect of environmental certification on sale prices and rents.  To control for 
differences between their sample of certified buildings (927 buildings) and a much larger 
sample of non-certified buildings, Miller et al include a number of control variables such as 
size, location and age in their hedonic regression framework. They find that dummy variables 
for Energy Star and LEED ratings show the expected positive sign but tests show that these 
results are not significant at the 10 percent level.  Using the same data, Miller et al (2008) also 
report respective sale price premiums of approximately 6% and 11% for Energy Star and 
LEED certified offices. Wiley, Benefield and Johnson (forthcoming) focused on the effect on 
rent, occupancy rate and sale price of eco-certification for Class A buildings in 46 office 
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markets across the USA4.  Using a hedonic pricing approach, they found rental premia 
ranging from approximately 15-18% for LEED certified buildings and 7-9% for Energy Star 
certified buildings depending on the model specification.  In terms of sales transactions, they 
estimated premia of $130 per sq ft for LEED certified buildings and $30 for Energy Star.  
However, although plausible, these results need to be treated with some caution.  A limitation 
of their hedonic model is their control for location.  In essence, they identify rental and sale 
premia for certified buildings relative to non-certified buildings in the same metropolitan 
area.  However, if certified buildings tend to be more likely to be in better quality locations 
within a metropolitan area, observed premia may include a location as well as a certification 
premium.    
 
Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley (EKQ) (2009) use a hedonic framework to investigate the effect 
of certification on the asking rents of 694 office buildings which were either LEED or Energy 
Star certified.  Using GIS techniques, they control for location effects by identifying other 
office buildings in the CoStar database within a radius of 0.2 miles of each certified building. 
The authors identify a statistically significant rent premium on asking rent per square foot of 
3.3% for Energy Star certified buildings.  Surprisingly, they find no significant rent premium 
for LEED-certified buildings. However, when they use “effective” rents which reflect the 
effect of different occupancy levels in the rental income of properties (nominal asking rent 
multiplied by the occupancy rate), the premium increased to around 10% for Energy Star 
certified buildings and they find 9% premium for LEED-certified buildings (although the 
latter is not significant at the conventional levels).   They also report similar results for 199 
sales that took place between 2004 and 2007.  They find a substantial 19% sale price premium 
for Energy Star certified buildings but no statistically significant sale price premium for 
LEED-certified buildings.  If these findings are confirmed, the implications for developers 
considering LEED certification as well as ‘green’ investors would be considerable.  It is 
therefore important that the absence of a premium for LEED buildings is either corroborated 
or refuted by other studies using a comparable analytical framework and dataset.   
 
As noted, the size and nature of the rental and sale price differentials between LEED and 
Energy Star certified buildings identified by EKQ is contrary to expectations and, if genuine, 
have major implications for the adoption of LEED certification in particular.  Our prior 
expectation for this study was that the LEED label is more prestigious than the Energy Star 
label.  Miller et al (2008) and Wiley et al (forthcoming) find that LEED certified offices 
command a larger premium than Energy Star certified offices.   
                                               
4
 Sales data were available for 26 office markets.   
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There are a number of potential problems with the approach adopted by EKQ.  A crucial part 
of any hedonic analysis is obviously the control for spatial and locational features of 
properties.  The controls applied by EKQ, i.e. using a standard 0.2 mile radius for all markets 
may not produce a proxy for actual submarkets. Within some of their clusters, there are likely 
to be different qualities of location.  In addition, there is an implicit assumption that a 0.2 mile 
radius is an appropriate geographical size for all locations.  However, there can be significant 
variations in the density of development and size of submarket between different locations.   
 
It is also possible that the definition of effective rents may be a source of bias in their results.  
If there are systematic differences in the proportion of single tenanted and multi-tenanted 
buildings between the certified and non-certified samples, the results may be biased.  For 
instance, if certified buildings have a higher propensity to have a single occupier, an effective 
rent premium would be identified separate from any certification effect.  For instance, Fuerst 
and McAllister (forthcoming) estimate that less than 10% of Energy Star certified offices 
have a single occupier compared to approximately 30% for the overall CoStar database.  
However, this source of potential bias may be mitigated by the fact that asking rents tend only 
to be recorded for multi-tenanted offices.  Compared to EKQ, we apply a similar hedonic 
methodology to a similar data set.  In contrast, we control for location effects using actual 
submarkets (as defined by CoStar) rather than arbitrary submarkets as this should reflect more 
accurately the varying density of office submarkets at both the metropolitan and the national 
level and incorporates the local market knowledge of experts who are likely to define these 
relatively homogenous markets better than an arbitrary fixed radius.  
 
 
The Empirical Model 
 
Rent determination is central to the revelation of WTP by occupiers.  There is a long 
established literature on the determinants of office rents that investigates the effect on rental 
levels of locational, physical and lease characteristics of commercial property assets.  
Following our theoretical exposition on hedonic prices and product differentiation in the real 
estate market, we apply a standard hedonic model to empirically test for the existence of a 
price and rent premium for eco-certified properties.  
 
Hedonic analysis 
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Hedonic regression modeling is the standard methodology for examining price determinants 
in real estate research. We use this method in our study primarily to isolate the effect of 
LEED and Energy Star certification. As described in the literature review section of this 
paper, higher mean rents or transaction prices may simply be due to the fact that certified 
buildings are newer, higher or located in more attractive locations or markets.  The 
quintessential log-linear hedonic rent model takes the following form:  
 
        (2) 
 
Where Ri is the natural log of average rent per square foot in a given building, xi is a vector of 
the natural log of several explanatory locational and physical characteristics5,  β  and φ are the 
respective vectors of parameters to be estimated. Zi is a vector of time-related variables and  
is a random error and stochastic disturbance term that is expected to take the form of a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a variance of . The hedonic weights assigned to each 
variable are equivalent to this characteristic’s overall contribution to the rental price (Rosen 
1974).  
 
For the purpose of this study, we specify two types of hedonic models. The first type explains 
rents and the second explains price per square foot in sales transactions.  
 
Hedonic Rent Model 
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(3) 
 
In this model, Ai represents the age of the property, measured from the year of construction or 
the year of a major refurbishment (whichever occurred more recently), Si is the number of 
stories of the property, Li represents the lot size, Ti and Gi are the latitude and longitude 
geographic coordinates of the property which capture any large-scale effects of the spatial 
distribution of properties across the country, Ni is a dummy variable indicating a net lease 
(taking the value of zero for a gross or full-service lease),  BCi are controls for building class 
                                               
5
 We acknowledge the substantial body of literature on the rental effects of age, vacancy levels, size 
and number of stories.  For a more comprehensive discussion of vacancy rates see Sirmans, Sirmans 
and Benjamin, 1989; Sirmans and Guidry, 1993; Clapp, 1993; Mills, 1992; for floor area see Clapp, 
1980; Gat, 1998; Bollinger, Ihlanfeldt and Bowes, 1998;  for age see Bollinger, Ihlanfeldt and Bowes, 
1998; Slade, 2000, Dunse et al, 2003; for height see Shilton and Zaccaria, 1994.  
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(standard categories A,B,C and F) and SUi  are controls for submarkets (853 in total) and εi is 
the error term which is assumed to be independent across observations and normally 
distributed with constant variance and a mean of zero. A rent premium for LEED and/or 
Energy Star rated buildings is captured by the GRi  term, a dichotomous variable that takes the 
value of 1 for certified buildings and a value of 0 otherwise. In alternative model 
specifications, the GRi  dummy variable is replaced by separate terms for LEED and Energy 
Star certification (Model 2) and level of LEED certification (Model 3).   
 
Hedonic Transaction Price Model 
 
Similarly, the regression for estimating price per square foot in sales transactions is estimated 
in the following way:  
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 (4) 
 
where Ei  is a time trend variable which accounts for general price inflation and other 
unobserved trends over time. This variable increases in semi-annual increments. Beyond this 
control for the overall trend, we also included MCi, which indicates market conditions at the 
time of sale proxied by the average quarterly return of the NAREIT index. All other variables 
are the same as in the rent model.  
 
The type of specification used in the rent and transaction price models allows us to detect 
differences in the weight of parameter estimates across submarkets, building class categories 
and market conditions by estimating separate intercepts. This Least Squares Dummy Variable 
(LSDV) approach has the advantage of controlling for a number of omitted variables, for 
example small-scale spatial effects at the submarket level that we could not model explicitly 
as the data necessary to do this were not available to us. The LSDV approach allows 
intercepts of the regression to differ across markets while assuming constant variable 
coefficients. This is important not only because of the difference in price levels across 
markets but also because it controls for tax and other incentives that several states and cities 
grant for buildings that are certified including tax credits, reduced permitting fees and 
property tax abatements (Roberts, 2007).  
 
Data 
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In the environmental valuation research, different methodological approaches have been taken 
to the estimation of WTP.  This study attempts to measure the revealed preferences of market 
participants.  Garrod and Willis (1999) evaluate the relative advantages and disadvantages 
stated versus revealed preference methods used in environmental valuation studies.  A key 
issue is the existence and quality of the market data.  In order to estimate revealed 
preferences, this study draws on CoStar's comprehensive national database which includes 
approximately 42.9 billion square feet of commercial space in two million properties making 
it the largest available real estate database in the United States. In an effort to provide details 
on the environmental performance of buildings, the CoStar Group began tagging LEED and 
Energy Star buildings approximately two years ago in collaboration with the US Green 
Building Council (USGBC) and the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  This 
enables researchers to identify numbers and types of LEED and Energy Star certified 
buildings in the database. For the purpose of a rigorous analysis of certified buildings, a key 
issue is the benchmark against which the sample of certified buildings can be compared. Our 
benchmark sample consists of approximately 24,479 office buildings in 853 submarkets in 81 
metropolitan areas spread throughout the United States.  This means that our hedonic model is 
measuring price differences between certified buildings and randomly selected non-certified 
buildings in the same metropolitan area controlling for differences in age, size, height, 
location, lease type, building class and submarket.   
 
In the first step, we drew details of approximately 1,900 eco-certified buildings of which 626 
were LEED certified and 1,282 were Energy Star. Of the LEED buildings, 31% (n=192) are 
certification-level, 29% (n=180) are Silver, 32% (n=201) are Gold and 7% (n=45) are 
Platinum level.  In the second step, buildings were selected in the same metropolitan areas 
and submarket as the certified sample. Sample selection was based on the criteria a) same 
submarket or market as certified buildings and b) at least 10 comparable observations for each 
certified building in the database. Although the market weightings may be different between 
the benchmark and the certified samples, our regression model controls for market-specific 
effects. In total, we have used 9,806 observations of transaction prices and 18,519 (asking) 
rent observations.  While transaction prices are considered over a period of ten years from 
1999 through 2008 to obtain a sufficiently large sample, all rent observations are as of Q4 
2008.   
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Results  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics are displayed in Table 1.  There are clearly some differences 
between eco-certified and non-certified buildings.  The former tend to be newer.  In 
particular, the median age of LEED certified buildings is five years.  The comparable figure 
for the benchmark sample is 23.  While there is relatively little difference between buildings 
with Energy Star certification and the benchmark sample in terms of age, the former tend to 
be dominated by tall buildings suggesting that they are mainly located in CBD locations.  This 
is supported by the fact that Energy Star buildings tend to be on average nearly 20 times 
larger than non-certified buildings.  Without controlling for the differences between the 
samples, certified buildings have higher asking rents and lower vacancy rates than non-
certified buildings.  Median asking rents are approximately 35% higher in LEED and Energy 
Star certified buildings.  There are also some notable differences in terms of the proportions 
of each sample that are on triple let leases compared to gross or full service leases.  Energy 
Star buildings have 12% and LEED buildings have 10% on net leases.  The comparable 
figures for the control sample is 22%. More thorough investigation is required, however, to 
infer a general prevalence of gross leases in certified buildings as the higher share may simply 
be reflective of differences in property types (particularly mono- vs. multi-tenanted 
properties) between the certified and the non-certified samples.  If confirmed, this would be 
consistent with the expectation that owners of certified buildings attempt to capture operating 
cost savings by offering primarily gross or full-service leases.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of overall sample with LEED and Energy Star 
sample 
 
Overall RENT  
$ psf 
PRICE 
 $ psf 
% LEASED SIZE (sq ft) STORIES AGE 
Mean 19.50 141.19 63.82 52,771 3.32 28.37 
Median 18.00 113.81 79.80 10,800 2.00 23.00 
Std. Dev. 9.16 112.50 38.87 145,147 5.75 27.48 
Skewness 2.40 1.77 -0.69 7.57 5.92 1.97 
Kurtosis 14.47 8.77 1.88 92,807 50.21 8.42 
Observations 16,488 9,120 24,951 16,488 24,479 21,147 
       
LEED RENT  
$ psf 
PRICE  
$ psf 
% LEASED SIZE (sq ft) STORIES AGE 
Mean 26.39 247.07 90.89 176,080 6.39 12.14 
Median 24.50 240.00 100.00 94,945 4.00 5.00 
Std. Dev. 10.34 137.85 22.95 25,882 8.22 19.46 
Skewness 1.53 0.41 22.95 467 3.04 3.17 
Kurtosis 7.23 3.37 -2.87 48.46 13.20 13.91 
Observations 197 127 626 626 581 469 
       
Energy Star RENT  
$ psf 
PRICE  
$ psf 
% LEASED SIZE (sq ft) STORIES AGE 
Mean 27.50 254.95 91.52 283,045 11.85 19.39 
Median 25.00 231.47 96.15 201,014 8.00 19.00 
Std. Dev. 11.32 137.00 12.78 262,829 11.32 13.26 
Skewness 1.75 1.42 -3.15 2.02 1.68 2.38 
Kurtosis 7.75 6.32 18.16 8.19 5.90 13.49 
Observations 834 559 1,282 1,282 1,256 1,276 
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Hedonic regression results – rental rates 
 
To further investigate the hypothesis of a rent and price premium for certified buildings, we 
estimate hedonic regressions as outlined above. Two separate regressions are estimated to 
model rent and transaction price separately. Continuous numeric variables were transformed 
to log values to (1) reduce non-normality found in initial examinations of the dataset, (2) to 
reduce heteroskedasticity and (3) to be able to interpret the results as elasticities. The results 
are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.  Observations for building age were segmented into deciles 
to allow for potentially time-varying age effects. 
  
When controlling for the most important rent determinants such as age, height, size and sub-
market location, we find a statistically significant rent premium of 4-5% in eco-certified 
buildings compared to non-certified buildings in the same sub-market area. The control 
variables used in the regression show the expected signs and most of them reach the desired 
significance levels. This regression explains just over 60% of the cross-sectional variation in 
rents in the entire sample. 
 
Model 2 shows the results of the regression with separate dichotomous variables for LEED 
and Energy Star certification. Both types of certification are found to exert a positive and 
significant impact on rents. While the premium for LEED is higher as expected, there is very 
little difference between the premia for LEED and Energy Star buildings.  A further common 
assumption that we set out to test is that the rent premium of LEED buildings is increasing 
with the level of certification. Model 3 in Table 2 reports the estimation results with a LEED 
level variable. In this specification, the dichotomous LEED variable is modified to reflect the 
certification standard, i.e. Certified, Silver, Gold and Platinum.  While the coefficients have 
the expected signs, only the Certified and Platinum levels are significant. 
 
Although it is not a central part of the study, it is interesting to compare the results of the 
control factors with the findings of other studies of office rent determinants.  Given a 
variation in data sources and model specifications, previous studies do not always provide 
consistent findings on the relationship between variables such as age, and height inter alia and 
office rents/prices.  As expected, we find that the coefficient for the age variable is negative.  
In addition, consistent with previous research (for example, see Bollinger, Ihlanfeldt and 
Bowes, 1998; Shilton and Zaccaria, 1994), we find that there is a significantly positive 
relationship between height and rent.  We also find a negative relationship between size and 
rent.  In common with Laverne and Winson-Geideman (2003), we find a negative relationship 
between triple net leases and the rental level.   
i tiiiiiii GRFLSOYR εββββββ +++++++= lnlnlnlnlnln 543210
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Table 2:  Results from hedonic model estimation of rental rates 
 
 
 
   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Dependent variable Rent psf 
(log) 
Rent psf 
(log) 
Rent psf 
(log) 
    
Constant 3.73*** 3.72*** 3.65*** 
Eco-certified 0.05***   
LEED  0.05**  
Certified   0.09** 
Silver   0.04 
Gold    0.03 
Platinum   0.16*** 
Energy Star  0.04*** 0.04*** 
Net Lease -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 
No. of stories (log) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
Size square feet (log) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
Site area (log) 0.01* 0.00* 0.00* 
Age (log)    
3-6 years -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
7-10 years -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
11-19 years -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.14*** 
20-23 years -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
23-26 years -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
27-31 years -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** 
32-42 years -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** 
43-62 years -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 
>62 years -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
Longitude (log) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
Latitude (log) -0.43*** -0.43** -0.41** 
Class A 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 
Class B 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.63 0.61 0.63 
F test 26.32*** 26.27*** 26.15*** 
Included observations 10,970 10,970 10,969 
 
   
 
*** - significant at 1% level 
** - significant at 5% level 
* - significant at 10% level 
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Hedonic regression results – sale prices 
 
Table 3 reports the results of the hedonic regressions with sales price per square foot as the 
dependent variable.  Three separate models were estimated with the same independent 
variable.  All models display similar results and have similar explanatory power.  The 
explanatory power of this model is lower relative to the regressions for the sample of rents.  
For most of the independent variables, the coefficients have the expected signs.  Compared to 
buildings in the age segment 0-2 years, the coefficient for the other age segments is positive. 
It is notable that buildings constructed in the first two years tend to sell at a discount 
compared to older buildings.  The coefficient on the age variable increases for buildings aged 
up to ten years and then starts to decline.   Model 1 suggests a sales premium of just below 
30% for eco-certified buildings.  In Model 2, we distinguish between LEED and Energy Star 
and find premia of 25% and 26% respectively.6 
 
When we break down the LEED sample into its various levels, we find significant premia for 
Silver, Gold and Platinum rated buildings.  Whilst the size of the premia appears extremely 
high, it should be noted that the sample size for Platinum rated buildings is very small.  From 
a total of 6153 sales, only eight involved Platinum rated buildings.  The sample sizes for 
Certified (n=35), Silver (n=47) and Gold (n=34) are higher and the raw data support the case 
for substantial premia with median sale prices of $194, $252 and $232 compared to a whole 
sample mean sale price of $113.  
 
The results suggest a much higher relative sales price premium compared to rental price 
premia.  There are a number of potential explanations.  A possible reason may be the 
combined effects on capital value of higher rental income, lower operating costs, increased 
occupancy rates, image benefits (to investors) and a lower risk premium.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
6
 The larger average premium of 30% for eco-certified buildings compared to LEED and Energy Star 
premia is due to the existence of a number of buildings that hold both types of certification. For these 
buildings, the rental premium will effectively be split between the LEED and Energy Star coefficients 
resulting in a lower premium compared to the overall eco-certified variable.  
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Table 3:  Results from hedonic model estimation of sales prices 
 
 
 
   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
    
Dependent variable Sale price 
psf (log) 
Sale price 
psf (log) 
Sale price 
psf (log) 
    
Constant 1.25 1.08 1.51 
Eco-certified 0.30***   
LEED  0.25***  
Certified   0.12 
Silver   0.33*** 
Gold    0.26** 
Platinum   0.67** 
Energy Star  0.26*** 0.27*** 
No. of stories (log) 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
Size square feet (log) -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.21*** 
Site area (log) 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
Age (log)    
3-6 years 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
7-10 years 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 
11-19 years 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 
20-23 years 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 
23-26 years 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
27-31 years 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
32-42 years 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
43-62 years 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 
>62 years 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
Longitude (log) -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** 
Latitude (log) 0.78* 0.82* 0.79* 
Class A 0.44*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
Class B 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
Time trend variable 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
Moderately strong 
market  
-0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
Moderately weak 
market  
-0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
Weak market -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.10*** 
SUBMARKET 
CONTROLS 
   
Adjusted R-squared 0.42 0.42 0.42 
F test 8.68*** 8.68*** 8.64*** 
Included observations 6,157 6,157 6,156 
 
*** - significant at 1% level 
** - significant at 5% level 
* - significant at 10% level 
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Conclusion 
 
Growing global concern about climate change is increasingly affecting the preferences of 
consumers and investors.  In addition, throughout the regulatory hierarchy, international, 
national and local governmental institutions are expanding the scope of environmental 
regulation affecting commercial real estate assets.  Similar to other product markets, a 
voluntary environmental certification system for new buildings and refurbishments has 
emerged in most mature real estate markets.  Despite the publicity and promotion, the 
voluntarily certified sector is miniscule in terms of the current total commercial real estate 
stock.  However, it is likely that eco-certification of commercial buildings will become 
progressively more important. 
 
A priori inference suggests that eco-certified buildings should obtain a rental and an asset 
price premium.  It is expected that investors’ holding costs should be lower due to 
attractiveness to occupiers associated with business performance, image, fiscal and/or other 
government incentives and lower running costs.  This can lead to a rental premium and/or 
lower vacancy rates.  For investors, there may be higher NOI due increased demand from 
occupiers, lower void rates, lower costs of ownership and an element of protection from 
future regulatory changes. The results of the empirical analysis confirm these expectations.  
The hedonic regressions suggest that there is a rental premium of approximately 5% for 
LEED certification and 4% for Energy Star.  For sales prices, we find price premia of 25% for 
LEED-certified buildings and 26% for Energy Star.   
 
Yet, there are a number of caveats attached to the interpretation of this and similar empirical 
studies of typical price differentials.  Firstly, the controls for inherent heterogeneity between 
certified and non-certified buildings are bound to be imperfect even when applying the most 
diligent sample selection process and the most comprehensive set of variables in the hedonic 
model.  For example, it is possible that the eco-certification process is only one element of 
additional investment to create a market leading product.  To control for all facets of such an 
approach to positioning an asset in the upper segment of the market is virtually impossible in 
the framework of a hedonic model.  Secondly, these empirical studies provide a cross-
sectional snapshot of price differentials for a specific sample in a specific time period.   It is 
expected that price differentials for certified buildings should vary over time and between 
buildings.  Attempts to profit from any current or historic price premia are faced with the 
standard 'developer’s dilemma' – that their supply response to current price differentials 
between certified and non-certified buildings is likely to affect the future price differential. 
Although the results are in line with the findings of the majority of studies on price premia of 
 26 
certified buildings, this is a study of a niche market with relatively small sample sizes.  As 
data availability as well as level of detail and accuracy is likely to improve over time, future 
research will be able to address a number of more specific issues such as the individual 
contributions of image benefits, higher productivity or lower operating costs to the "green 
premium".   
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